This paper examines strategic investment in the context of a duopolistic continuoustime real options game. Our contribution is twofold, economic and methodological. The former is the recognition that, under …xed costs of investment and time-to-build, the …rm pays a fraction of the implicit strike price to its competitor in the form of transferred foregone consumer demand. The latter is the introduction of the early exercise premium representation as a valuable device for the characterization of optimal exercise policies in real options games. We …nd that positive capital depreciation, technology improvement, and harm e¤ects to the low-technology producer are not su¢ cient to generate equilibria characterized by action.
Introduction
Since the seminal work of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) on the optimal adoption of new technologies by competing …rms under conditions of certainty, a signi…cant research e¤ort has been devoted to the analysis of optimal strategic investment decisions in the presence of uncertainty. Because (i) the optimal timing of project initiation resembles the optimal exercise of an American option and (ii) …rm interactions tend to play a crucial role in the adoption of new technologies, this literature has merged the option-pricing methodology with the game-theoretical paradigm to analyze what is best viewed as strategic capital replacement games. Huisman, Kort, Pawlina and Thijssen (2003) o¤er a representative treatment of real options within the game-theory framework: in particular, they extend the work of Smets (1991) by applying a method involving symmetric mixed strategies and they review previous models featuring asymmetric …rms as well as decreasing uncertainty over time. Grenadier (1996) develops an equilibrium model for the optimal investment timing of two symmetric …rms competing in the real estate market. Working backwards in a dynamic programming fashion, Grenadier determines the optimal exercise policies for his duopoly model and provides a rational explanation for overbuilding in the real estate market. Huisman and Kort (1998) adapt the Stenbacka and Tombak (1994) framework to analyze technology adoption assuming a stochastic time-to-build delay. They consider dispersed versus joint equilibria in the case of endogenous …rms'roles and they …nd that the pro…t stream belonging to the preemption equilibrium can be so low that both …rms would be better o¤ never exercising their capital-replacement option. For a standard textbook treatment of real investment under uncertainty, the reader is referred to Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . Also, the survey article by Boyer, Gravel and Lasserre (2004) reviews the recent contributions to the literature on strategic investment games.
The isomorphism between a …rm's real investment projects and a set of …nancial positions in American options permits the application of some of the most advanced techniques developed in contingent claims analysis. The American option valuation problem was …rst studied as an optimal stopping time problem by Samuelson (1965) and McKean (1965) . Widely acknowledged shortcomings of the stopping time approach are its lack of direct insights into the shape of the immediate exercise boundary and the fact that it does not lead to e¢ cient numerical procedures. Nonetheless, building on this approach, Kim (1990) , Jacka (1991) and Carr, Jarrow, and Myneni (1992) derive a powerful decomposition of the American option value that emphasizes the premium attached to early exercise. In particular, the early exercise premium (EEP) representation expresses an American option as the combination of a European option and the right to exercise the option early. This representation is central to the analysis of American-style derivatives in the recent book by Detemple (2006) . This paper considers an economy populated by two symmetric …rms, each holding a unique capital-replacement option over an in…nite horizon. Until one of the two …rms exercises its capital-replacement option, both …rms operate the same technology. Upon exercising its investment option, a …rm is endowed with a full stock of higher-quality productive capital, which depreciates over time at a constant rate. A second mover disadvantage is introduced additively in the revenues of the …rm that still operates the old technology.
The contribution of this paper is twofold, economic and methodological. The economic contribution is the recognition that, under …xed costs of investment and time-to-build, a …rm's exercise of its capital-replacement option leads not only to a temporary "loss of output associated with the acquisition and installation of new capital goods (Cooper et al. 1999 , p. 923)" but also to a signi…cant temporary reallocation of the …rm's revenues to its competitor. Upon exercising its investment option, the …rm pays a fraction of the implicit strike price to its competitor in the form of transferred foregone consumer demand. The methodological contribution is the introduction of the EEP representation as a valuable device for the characterization of optimal exercise policies in real options games.
The aim of our article is the analysis of perpetual inaction along the equilibrium path. This is motivated by our belief that the correct place to begin the thorough study of strategic interaction and its determinants is the derivation of a set of economic and mathematical conditions under which both …rms optimally retain their investment option forever. Departures from these benchmark conditions are necessary to deliver active strategic interactions, as those observed daily in the real world.
We …nd that (i) in the absence of capital depreciation, despite the value of the follower's future revenues upon exercise approaching in…nity, it is never optimal for the follower to exercise its investment option and (ii) even in the presence of a strictly positive depreciation rate, and despite the technology improvement, the follower chooses never to exercise the American option, leading to perpetual inaction on the part of both …rms. Furthermore, a second mover disadvantage that is not proportional to the …rm's revenues is crucial to obtain a non-degenerate investment policy on the part of the follower. In this context, the EEP formula produces a recursive integral equation, which can be used to study the characteristics of the follower's optimal exercise boundary. Taking as given the follower's optimal response function, the leader's policy equation is analytically intractable. However, a speci…c case brings our analysis to a de…nitive conclusion: in the extreme case in which harm e¤ects to the low-technology producer grow so large that immediate reaction is optimal for the follower, the leader's policy reduces to a closed form expression. The application of EEP analysis to this closed form solution shows that the leader optimally delays investment forever, thereby producing a perpetual inaction equilibrium.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic model: the stochastic process for market demand as well as the Markovian revenue equations are introduced. Also, we emphasize the relation of our model to the Grossman and Helpman (1991) model of sequential quality improvements. In Section 3 we illustrate the derivation of the trigger boundaries for both …rms via the EEP representation. We analyze the case of no capital depreciation as well as that of a strictly positive depreciation rate. In Section 4 special attention is devoted to the study of harm e¤ects to the follower's revenues. In Section 5 we summarize the results of the paper. Mathematical derivations are collected in an Appendix (Section 6).
The Model
In this Section we describe the basic model: …rst we introduce the stochastic process for market demand and the Markovian revenue equations, and then we relate our model to the Grossman and Helpman (1991) model of sequential quality improvements.
Consider an in…nite-horizon economy populated by two …rms. At time t = 0, …rm ii 2 f1; 2g -produces y i = units of output, which depreciate at a constant obsolescence rate 0. At time t i , …rm i initiates its capital-replacement process, which leads the new capital of quality ( > 1 is a quality factor common across …rms) to be operational at time t i + , where is a strictly positive time-to-build delay. At time t i + , …rm i is endowed with , a full stock of higher-quality productive capital. Beyond this point, each …rm's capital stock depreciates at rate . We denote y i;t = k i;t as …rm i's output capacity at time t. The aggregate quantity produced is given by
The inverse demand function for this commodity is given by
where @D(Y ) @Y < 0 and X t is an exogenous demand-shock process that obeys
We account for quality improvement by assuming that the adoption of the new technology allows the …rm to sell its output at a per-unit price equal to P t . As we shall see, this feature of the model is pivotal in proving the consistency of our assumptions with Grossman and Helpman's results. In this economy, the risk-free rate is a constant r > 0. Until one of the two …rms exercises its capital-replacement option, both …rms operate the same technology. Suppose that, without loss of generality, …rm 1 is the …rst …rm to exercise its investment option, i.e. …rm 1 is the Stackelberg 1 leader. At time t 1 , …rm 1 suspends its production operations and pays a …xed cost I.
The revenue for …rm 1, R 1 (t) = k 1;t P t , follows
On the other hand, the revenue for …rm 2, R 2 (t) = k 2;t P t , follows
Equation (5) embodies our paper's economic recognition that, under …xed costs of investment and time-to-build, a …rm's exercise of its capital-replacement option leads not only to a temporary "loss of output associated with the acquisition and installation of new capital goods (Cooper et al. 1999 , p. 923)" but also to a signi…cant temporary reallocation of the …rm's revenues to its competitor. Upon exercising its investment option, the …rm pays a fraction of the implicit strike price to its competitor in the form of transferred foregone consumer demand. This e¤ect is captured by the fact that
Relation to Grossman and Helpman (1991)
Grossman and Helpman develop a model of repeated product improvements in a continuum of sectors, in which each product follows a stochastic progression up a quality ladder. Consumers share a common intertemporal utility function, which they maximize subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. At every point in time the maximization occurs in two stages: …rst, the consumer allocates her ‡ow of spending to maximize the instantaneous utility for given prices and then she chooses the time pattern of spending to maximize her intertemporal utility function. To solve the static problem, the consumer optimally selects a bundle of products with equal quality-adjusted prices. 2 In their model, progress is not uniform across sectors and in equilibrium the distribution of qualities evolves over time.
The following Proposition demonstrates the consistency of our assumptions with the results of Grossman and Helpman's model. Proof. Recall that, in our model, until one of the two …rms exercises its capital-replacement option, both …rms operate the same technology. Upon exercising its investment option, a …rm is endowed with a full stock of productive capital whose quality is > 1. According to Eq. (2) the price of the higher-quality producer (the leader) is X t D( 
quality-adjusted price for high-quality producer
quality-adjusted price for low-quality producer :
2 See Grossman and Helpman (1991, pp. 45-46) for mathematical derivations.
Equation (6) proves that quality-adjusted prices are equal across …rms, which is consistent with the results of Grossman and Helpman's model of quality improvements.
Having completed the presentation of our model, we can now exploit the early exercise premium representation to study the characteristics of optimal …rm policies.
Characterizing Firm Policies Via the EEP Representation
In this Section we illustrate the derivation of the trigger boundaries for both …rms via the EEP representation. We analyze the case of no capital depreciation as well as that of a strictly positive depreciation rate.
Since we assume that …rm 1 is the …rst to invest in a new capital stock, we begin by determining the optimal policy for …rm 2 in a backward induction manner. We then turn to …rm 1's problem. This solution method follows the standard Stackelberg mechanism for subgame perfect equilibria, imposing sequentiality. 3 Consider the problem of …rm 2. Since …rm 1 has already exercised its capital-replacement option, we focus on times t t 1 , the investment initiation time for …rm 1. For any such t, …rm 2's value is equal to the value of one of the following two options: (i) an option to initiate the capital-replacement process between t 1 and t 1 + , whose value is denoted by F , and (ii) an option that allows to initiate the investment process beyond time t 1 + , whose value is denoted by W . If unexercised at time t 1 + , the F option expires and is exchanged with the W option. Recall from Eq. (5) that the revenue stream for …rm 2 will be equal to k 2;t [X t D(k 2;t )] over the time interval t 1 t < t 1 + and it will be equal to
Firm 2' s Optimal Behavior Beyond t 1 +
Suppose that …rm 1 has already begun to produce using its new capital stock. The strategy space for …rm 2 is S t 1 + ;1 , the set of stopping times that take values between t 1 + and 1. For any t 2 2 S t 1 + ;1 , the value of the follower's capital-replacement option is given by
whereẼ t is the expectation operator with respect to the Cox and Ross (1976) risk-neutral measure. In Eq. (7) dH t is the ‡ow of instantaneous revenues received until the time of exercise, 4 which is equal to
and EP t is the value of the future ‡ow of revenues earned beyond time t 2 + when the option to replace the …rm's capital is exercised at time t = t 2 . In what follows, we assume a speci…c functional form for the market demand D(Y t ). In particular, we adopt the form D(Y t ) = Y t , where is the constant inverse elasticity parameter taking values in the interval (0; 1). 5 Under this assumption, we derive the value of the future ‡ow of revenues conditional on immediate exercise, which is
(1 ) :
For the analysis of strategic …rm behavior as that embedded in Eq. (7), this paper relies on the early exercise premium (EEP) representation for American options as exposed in Detemple (2006, p. 3 and pp. 41-43). The early exercise premium representation is parametric in that it expresses the American option value as a function of its unknown optimal exercise boundary. However, using the fact that immediate exercise is optimal when the boundary is reached, the EEP formula produces a recursive integral equation, which can be used to study the characteristics of the boundary. More speci…cally the EEP representation formula provides a decomposition of the American contingent claim into its European counterpart and the right to exercise the option early. 7 Accordingly, Eq. (7) can be represented as the sum of a European option and the early exercise premium, denoted EEP t . Hence, Eq. (7) becomes
5 The restriction on the parameter is imposed to guarantee that, as the intial capital stock depreciates, …rms will potentially have an incentive to invest in the new technology. Indeed, it is straightforward to show that, unless 2 (0; 1), …rm revenues approach the geometric Brownian motion Xt 2 ( = 1) or explode ( > 1), which represent degenerate cases. 6 The mathematical derivation of EP t is contained in the Appendix. 7 An alternative decomposition is the delayed exercise premium (DEP) representation, which emphasizes the gains from waiting to exercise. The DEP representation, developed by Carr, Jarrow, and Myneni (1992), expresses the value of the American option as the sum of the payo¤s upon immediate exercise and the additional value of waiting. in which
where v is the …rst time at which exercise becomes optimal. Detemple (2006, p. 43) provides valuable intuition for the components of the EEP t . The local gains from early exercise are given by Eq. (11): r [EP v I] dv is the amount of interest collected over time if one invests immediately and places the proceeds in the riskless account, dA v is the loss incurred by exercising early due to foregone expected appreciation in the payo¤s, and dH v is the loss due to foregone cash ‡ows earned prior to investment. In the next Lemma we derive the explicit expression for the expected appreciation in payo¤s dA t .
Lemma 1
The expected appreciation in future revenues dA t is equal to
Proof. We follow the proof of Theorem 34, p. 76 in Detemple (2006) . A standard application of Ito's Lemma to Eq. (9) yields
(1 )
where = r under the risk-neutral measure. Armed with an explicit formula for each of the components entering Eq. (11), we can state an interesting result on the optimal behavior of …rm 2 when the rate of depreciation is equal to zero. The next Proposition exempli…es how the adoption of the EEP representation allows for the immediate detection of degenerate investment policies.
Proposition 2 If the rate of depreciation is equal to zero, then (i) the value of the …rm's future revenues upon exercise approaches +1 and (ii) the follower never exercises its investment option.
Proof.
(i) Let
be the state-price density (Vasicek, 1977) , in which = r is the market price of risk. Then, under no depreciation, EP t is
(ii) Under the risk-neutral measure and with no depreciation,
where the second equality is obtained by using the result in Lemma 1 and setting = 0. Because ( rIdv dH v ) is always negative, the American option will never be exercised prior to its maturity date T , for T ! +1. See Detemple (2006, p. 43).
Proposition 2 reveals a perhaps counterintuitive result: despite the fact that the value of the payo¤s upon exercise approaches in…nity, the follower optimally chooses perpetual inaction when = 0. The EEP representation produces this conclusion readily by showing that there can be no local gains from early exercise. This provides evidence of the EEP approach's value as a detection mechanism for degenerate equilibria in real options games.
The result stated in Proposition 2 (ii) is directly related to Merton's (1973) demonstration that it is never optimal to exercise an American call option on a non-dividend-paying asset prior to its maturity date. In particular, the local gains from early exercise reduce to rIdv, in our notation, since the option studied by Merton bears no dividends. The question remains as to whether the introduction of capital depreciation is su¢ cient to generate an incentive for the follower to invest with a positive probability. This is the object of Proposition 3.
Proposition 3
In the case of a strictly positive depreciation rate , despite the quality factor > 1, the follower chooses never to initiate the capital-replacement process.
Proof. For any T > t 1 + ,
where
is always negative. The second equality is obtained by re-expressing dH v as a function of EP v . In particular, Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) yield
Equation (12) provides the insight necessary to understand Proposition 3. In particular, dA t can be rewritten as
acts as a deterministic negative dividend rate on the underlying investment payo¤s. This proves that capital depreciation is not su¢ cient to guarantee a non-degenerate behavior on the part of the follower. This result suggests that the introduction of a second mover disadvantage is required to create adequate incentives for the follower to exercise its investment option.
Proposition 3 implies that the American investment option held by the follower can be valued as a perpetual European call option whose price is determined by the following Proposition.
Proposition 4
In the case of a strictly positive depreciation rate , and a quality factor > 1, the investment option held by the follower can be treated as a perpetual European option, whose value is
Proof. See Appendix for details.
As shown in the Appendix, W t (EP; H; 1) can be expressed as
which allows us to relate our …nding to the well-established result that, under the assumption of no payouts to the common stock over the life of the contract, the price of a perpetual warrant equals the price of the common stock. This result was obtained in di¤erent environments by Samuelson (1965) , Samuelson and Merton (1969) , Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) . In our case, because (i) dH t acts as a stochastic positive dividend rate on the option and (ii) a positive depreciation rate translates into a negative dividend rate on the underlying investment opportunity EP t , we …nd that the perpetual European option exceeds the value of the ‡ow of revenues upon exercise, EP t . Propositions 3 and 4 complete the analysis of …rm 2's optimal behavior beyond t 1 + . In the next Subsection we consider the follower's optimal behavior in the time interval [t 1 ; t 1 + ] in which the leader shuts down its operations to install the new capital goods. Recall that the follower's option to initiate the capital-replacement process between t 1 and t 1 + , denoted by F , will be exchanged for W t 1 + (EP; H; 1) if no investment is undertaken by t 1 + . Thus, the minimum value of the F option at time t 1 + will be W t 1 + (EP; H; 1). With this in place, we can turn to the question of whether (and when) …rm 2 would replace its capital prior to (or exactly at) t 1 + .
Firm 2' s Optimal Behavior Prior to t 1 +
Suppose that …rm 1 has not begun to produce with the newly-purchased stock of capital. The strategy space for …rm 2 is S t 1 ;t 1 + , the set of stopping times that take values between t 1 and t 1 + . For any t 2 2 S t 1 ;t 1 + , the value of the follower's capital-replacement option is given by 
in which
and EP t is given by Eq. (9), as a consequence of the time-to-build delay. This in turn implies that the expected appreciation in future revenues dA t is given by EP t
Proposition 5 In the case of a strictly positive depreciation rate the follower chooses never to exercise the option F t (EP; H; t 2 ) prior to its maturity date t 1 + .
Proof. For any t 1 + ,
is always negative. The F option is not priced since it does not enter future derivations nor does it suggest further links to the option theory literature, as did the W option. The reader can easily value the option, if so desired, by following the lines of the proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix.
Since Propositions 3 and 5 show that …rm 2 will never optimally exercise the capital replacement-option prior to and beyond t 1 + , it remains to be shown whether investment occurs at t 1 + precisely. Proposition 6 Firm 2 will never exercise its capital-replacement option.
Proof. In Proposition 3 we prove that, for t > t 1 + , …rm 2 will never exercise the option W t (EP; H; 1). Also, in Proposition 5 we demonstrate that, for t 1 t < t 1 + , …rm 2 will never exercise the option F t (EP; H; t 2 ). It remains to show whether …rm 2 initiates its investment process exactly at time t 1 + . Exercise will occur only if 
which implies that …rm 2 will never initiate its capital-replacement process. Proposition 6 could be directly derived by recognizing that, because the value of the perpetual European option W t 1 + (EP; H; 1) exceeds EP t 1 + as stated in Proposition 4, W t 1 + (EP; H; 1) must be in excess of the net payo¤ upon exercise EP t 1 + I. Having determined the optimal policy for …rm 2, we now turn to …rm 1's problem.
Firm 1' s Optimal Investment Behavior
The previous Subsections have shown that …rm 2 will never initiate its capital-replacement process, regardless of …rm 1's investment policy t 1 . This simpli…es signi…cantly the optimal stopping-time problem of the leader, since …rm 1 need not consider strategic interactions while optimizing. The leader …rm holds a perpetual American option with a strike price equal to I and a dividend rate equal to
Upon exercising the option, it receives
The strategy space for …rm 1 is S 0;1 , the set of stopping times that take values between 0 and 1. For any t 1 2 S 0;1 , the value of the leader's capital-replacement option is given by
The following Lemma derives the expected appreciation in future revenues that will be used to quantify potential local gains from early exercise.
Lemma 2 The expected appreciation in future revenues is
Proof. Applying Ito's Lemma to Equation (25) yields
Having now acquired all the elements necessary for the implementation of the EEP representation, we sign the local gains associated with the G option and we derive the optimal investment policy for …rm 1.
Proposition 7 Firm 1 will not exercise its capital-replacement option.
Proof. Before proceeding with the proof let us rearrange Eq. (23) to express dH t as a function of EP t . We obtain
Using Eq. (28) the early exercise premium for the leader …rm becomes
which leads to perpetual inaction since
Interestingly, even though (i) productive capital continuously depreciates at a strictly positive rate , (ii) investing in new capital yields a revenue enhancing quality improvement > 1, and (iii) …rm 1 is unencumbered with strategic considerations, since the follower optimally chooses to never install new capital goods, …rm 1 …nds it optimal to perpetually delay the adoption of the new technology. This result suggests that the introduction of a second mover disadvantage is required to create adequate incentives for both …rms to exercise their investment option. The introduction of such a harm e¤ect to the follower's revenues allows us to illustrate another use of the EEP representation in strategic real option games. The next Section modi…es the model described in Section 2 to account for harm e¤ects.
An Amended Model with Harm E¤ects
Grenadier (1996) develops an equilibrium model for the optimal investment timing of two symmetric …rms competing in the real estate market, in which he accounts for the degree of "harm" to the follower's revenues caused by the leader's adoption of the improved technology. Along the same line of reasoning, this Section introduces a constant additive harm e¤ect h > 0 in the revenue of …rm 2 as a penalty for producing with the old technology. This penalty may be motivated as part of a consumer retention e¤ort via advertising. While the revenue equations for …rm 1 are unchanged, the revenue equations for …rm 2 are lessened by h in the time interval [t 1 + ; t 2 ], starting when the leader re-enters the market after the acquisition and installation of the new capital goods. Equation (29) contains the revenues for …rm 2 in the amended model.
In this amended environment we exploit the EEP approach to measure local gains from early exercise and, in particular, (i) we derive a su¢ cient condition for the follower to invest with positive probability in equilibrium, (ii) we demonstrate the relation of our results with Grenadier's and (iii) we obtain a non-linear recursive integral equation that can be used to obtain the follower's optimal trigger boundary.
Firm 2' s Optimal Behavior Beyond t 1 + Including Harm E¤ects
Suppose that …rm 1 has already begun to produce using its new capital stock. Accordingly, …rm 2's capital-replacement option is given by Eq. (10) . While the instantaneous revenue ‡ow is altered to be consistent with Eq. (29), and it obeys
the value of future payo¤s upon exercise, EP t , is una¤ected by the harm e¤ect and thus is given by Equation (9). This in turn implies that the expected appreciation in payo¤s, dA t , is given by Lemma 1. The following two Propositions derive a closed form expression for the EEP, which is used to provide a su¢ cient condition for perpetual inaction on the part of both …rms.
Proposition 8 For any maturity date T , T ! 1, the early exercise premium EEP t takes the form
Proof. Rearranging Eq. (30) to express dH t as a function of EP t yields
which is substituted in Eq. (11) to obtain
Proposition 9 A su¢ cient condition for perpetual inaction by both …rms is that the constant harm e¤ect h be less than or equal to rI.
Proof. Consider Eq. (31) under the condition that h rI. It follows directly that v is always less than
, for all v. Since this last term is always non-positive, we …nd that, beyond time t 1 + , there are no local gains from early exercise and …rm 2's EEP is worthless. Perpetual inaction for both …rms follows from Propositions 3, 5, 6, and 7.
In what follows, we further discuss our assumption of an additive rather than a proportional harm e¤ect in relation to Grenadier's (1996) model. We show via the EEP representation how a multiplicative harm e¤ect delivers a degenerate …rm behavior in our model while it does not in Grenadier's simpler environment.
Remark 1
In the presence of a multiplicative harm e¤ect, Propositions 3, 5, 6, and 7 obtain and deliver perpetual inaction on the part of both …rms. Indeed, under the alternative assumption of proportional harm e¤ects, Eq. (30) becomes
in which the last equality is the result of standard algebraic manipulations to rewrite dH t as a function of EP t . Correspondingly, Eq. (11) becomes
The previous Remark motivates our adoption of an additive harm e¤ect, which has signi…cantly di¤erent implications than its multiplicative counterpart. However, this does not apply to Grenadier's model since, with constant revenues prior to investment, multiplicative and additive harm e¤ects are equivalent, the proof of which is the object of the following Remark. Grenadier (1996) . Grenadier develops a strategic real options game, which he solves via the partial di¤erential equation (PDE) approach. In order to obtain the follower's investment policy he solves the di¤erential equation
Remark 2 Relation to
subject to the following optimality conditions
Equation (33) is the value-matching condition, which requires that the value of the option upon exercise be equal to the value of the net payo¤, Eq. (34) is the smooth-pasting or highcontact condition (Merton, 1973) , which requires that marginal gains be equated, and Eq. (35) is an absorbing barrier preventing arbitrage. We adapt Grenadier's notation to ours with the exception of D(Q), which is a deterministic inverse demand function with Q 2 f1; 2g representing the number of new production facilities and X F , which is the constant trigger boundary for the follower. R is the constant ‡ow of revenues earned by the follower until exercise. It is trivial to show that Eq. (33) can be re-expressed as
where h0 = hR r is the additive harm e¤ect corresponding to h. Hence, in Grenadier's simpler environment, considering an additive rather than proportional harm e¤ect leaves the problem unaltered.
Proposition 10 below derives a pseudo closed form solution for the value of the capitalreplacement option held by the follower beyond t 1 + , which is instrumental in obtaining a recursive integral equation for the trigger boundary.
Proposition 10 If h > rI, the value of the American capital-replacement option held by …rm 2 beyond time t 1 + is given by
and B v is the immediate exercise boundary.
Proof. A pseudo closed form solution is derived for the value of the early exercise premium as a function of the unknown exercise boundary B v as in Kim (1990) , Jacka (1991) , and Carr-Jarrow-Myneni (1992). See Appendix for details. Equation (37) represents the American option value in terms of the unknown optimal exercise boundary B v , thereby making it a pseudo rather than an actual closed form solution. By using the fact that immediate exercise is optimal when the boundary is reached, the EEP formula produces a recursive integral equation for the trigger boundary, which is derived in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 For any given T , T ! 1, the immediate exercise boundary B solves the recursive non-linear integral equation
where the terminal boundary is B T = I.
Proof. The result follows directly from Proposition 31 and Corollary 34 of Detemple (2006), which state that the terminal boundary is given by the maximum of the strike price and the strike price multiplied by the ratio of the risk-free rate to the implicit dividends yield on the underlying asset, i.e., in our context,
Equation (38) can be solved numerically via a recursive algorithm that makes use of the terminal value given by Eq. (39). The limiting trigger frontier (or immediate exercise boundary) can be approximated by iterating with increasingly large T .
Firm 2' s Optimal Behavior Prior to t 1 + Including Harm E¤ects
Because the harm e¤ect penalizes …rm 2 only after …rm 1 re-enters the market, the problem of optimal exercise of the capital-replacement option prior to …rm 1's re-entry is unchanged relative to Subsection 3.2. Therefore, we …nd that …rm 2 will never exercise its capital replacement option prior to time t 1 + .
Firm 1' s Optimal Behavior Including Harm E¤ects
As was the case in Subsection 3.3, …rm 1 holds a perpetual American option with a strike price I and an option dividend rate equal to
Upon exercising the option, …rm 1 receives
2 )(v t)+ (Zv Zt)g e f (2 ) vg dv
2 )(v t)+ (Zv Zt)g dv
2 )(v t)+ (Zv Zt)g dv :
For any of …rm 1's option-exercise policies t 1 2 S 0;1 , where S 0;1 is the set of stopping times that take values between 0 and 1, the value of its capital-replacement option is given by
While Eq. (42) is analytically intractable because t 2 is a random variable preventing the passage of the expectation operator into the integrals, a speci…c case is su¢ cient to bring our analysis to a de…nitive conclusion. In particular, we consider the extreme case in which the harm e¤ect h is so large (h ! 1) that exercising the option at time t 1 + is optimal also surely. The opposite limiting case occurs as h goes to zero, and t 2 ! 1 with probability one, for which Propositions 3, 5, 6, and 7 obtain. Consider Eq. (37) as h is made increasingly large. For any given boundary B, W t (EP; H; t 2 ) can be rewritten as
whose …rst three terms are bounded for any t 2 2 S t 1 + ;1 . We focus on the last term in Eq. (44) under the assumption that B v is not identically equal to zero, so that 0
which implies that @W @h j B < 0:
Recall that …rm 2 optimally chooses to exercise its option at time t 1 + whenever
as in Proposition 6. In light of Eq. (45), Eq. (46) can be forced to obtain by selecting a su¢ ciently large harm e¤ect. Indeed, the value of the option is reduced by a large h down to the point at which …rm 2 prefers to exercise immediately, which is equivalent to setting B t 1 + = 0. Under these conditions, Eq. (42) becomes
A standard application of Ito's Lemma to Eq. (47) yields
Substituting dA t in Eq. (11) shows that there can be no local gains from early exercise and that perpetual inaction obtains.
Conclusion
In recent years a signi…cant research e¤ort has been devoted to the analysis of optimal strategic investment decisions in the presence of uncertainty. Because (i) the optimal timing of project initiation resembles the optimal exercise of an American option and (ii) …rm interactions tend to play a crucial role in the adoption of new technologies, this literature has merged the option-pricing methodology with the game-theoretical paradigm to analyze what is best viewed as strategic capital replacement games. The isomorphism between a …rm's real investment projects and a set of …nancial positions in American options permits the application of some of the most advanced techniques developed in contingent claims analysis, such as the early exercise premium (EEP) representation, which expresses an American option as the combination of a European option and the right to exercise the option early. This paper considers an economy populated by two symmetric …rms, each holding a unique capital-replacement option over an in…nite horizon. In addition, a second mover disadvantage is introduced additively in the revenues of the …rm that still operates the old technology. The contribution of this paper is twofold, economic and methodological. The economic contribution is the recognition that, under …xed costs of investment and time-tobuild, the …rm pays a fraction of the implicit strike price to its competitor in the form of transferred foregone consumer demand. The methodological contribution is the introduction of the EEP representation as a valuable device for the characterization of optimal exercise policies in real options games.
We …nd that (i) in the absence of depreciation, despite the value of the follower's future revenues upon exercise approaching in…nity, the follower never exercises its investment option and (ii) even in the presence of a strictly positive depreciation rate, and despite the technology improvement, the follower chooses never to exercise the American option, leading to perpetual inaction on the part of both …rms. Furthermore, a second mover disadvantage that is not proportional to the …rm's revenues is crucial to obtain a non-degenerate investment policy on the part of the follower. In this context, the EEP formula produces a recursive integral equation, which can be used to study the characteristics of the follower's optimal exercise boundary. Taking as given the follower's optimal response function, the leader's policy equation is analytically intractable. However, a speci…c case brings our analysis to a de…n-itive conclusion: in the extreme case in which harm e¤ects to the low-technology producer grow so large that immediate reaction is optimal for the follower, the leader's policy reduces to a closed form expression. The application of EEP analysis to this closed form solution shows that the leader optimally delays investment forever, thereby producing a perpetual inaction equilibrium.
Appendix
This Subsection contains lengthy proofs and mathematical derivations used in the body of the article. 
Derivation of Firm 2' s EP
t EP t = E t Z 1 t+ t;v k 2;v X v D( 2 i=1 k i;v ) dv = X t E t [ Z 1 t+ e f [r+ 1 2 2 ](v t) (zv zt)g e f (v t )g e f[ 1 2 2 ](v t)+ (zv zt)g e f (v t 1 )g + e f (v t )g dv] = 1 e f t+(1 ) g X t Z 1 t+ e f vg e f (v t 1 )g + e f (v t)g dv = 1 e f t+(1 ) g e f t 1 g + e f tg X t Z 1 t+ e f ( 1)vg dv = 1 X t ( 1) e f t+ (1 ) g e f t 1 g + e f
Proposition 4
In the case of a strictly positive depreciation rate , and a quality factor > 1, the option can be treated as a pure European option, whose value is given by 
:
Consider now the …rst term in Equation (65).
